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Mingjie Hoemmen*

VERTICAL AND HORIZONTAL MODES OF
INJUSTICE IN AIR POLLUTION: A COMPARISON
OF LAW AND SOCIETY IN CHINA AND THE U.S.
On the night of November 18, 2017, a big residential fire broke out in the
outskirts of Beijing, taking 19 lives. The Beijing city fire department’s investigation
determined that the fire was caused by illegal recompartmentalization of a storage
building into part-storage, part-rental units. Tenants were stacked up in small rooms.1
Seizing the chance for swift action against illegal rental units, the city government
began removing tens of thousands of migrant workers who were renting similar
cheap housing just outside the city limits of Beijing. The newly evicted had to leave
quickly and find new living arrangements, whether inside of the city or elsewhere,
with no government assistance.2 These people worked inside Beijing handling
unskilled jobs such as food delivery, garbage collection, and construction work. The
large-scale eviction has been largely criticized as the government’s way of purging
major cities of their population of low-end laborers who have become unneeded as
China’s economy transitions from unskilled manufacturing towards high-tech
services.3 Social media began to show new articles and videos about the government
kicking the “DiDuan,” literally “low-end laborers,” out of the cheap rentals.4 The
government denies this purge, but the mass eviction nevertheless stirred up a public
outcry both domestically as well as internationally.
The main reason for the mass eviction, however, is the Chinese national
government’s “Blue Sky” project, which was designed to tackle the ever-worsening
air pollution problem.5 Blue Sky has invested heavily in converting all of China from

*Mingjie Hoemmen was born in Beijing, China. She has a B.A. in Mass Communications from the
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Law in 2019
1. DaXing He Yong (贺勇), Beijing Daxing Yunanzhe Mingdan Gongbu Guanfang Xingyu 18 Ren
(北京大兴火灾遇难者名单公布 警方刑拘18人) [Fire Victim Name List Published, 18 Responsible
Arrested], RENMIN WANG (⼈⺠⽹) [PEOPLE’S DAILY] (Nov. 20, 2017), http://society.people.com.cn
/n1/2017/1120/c1008-29657619.html.
2. Beijing Daxing Da Huo Hou Anquan Zhengzhi Guangmei Fouren Jieji Qingli “Diduan Renkou”
(北京⼤兴⼤⽕后安全整治 官媒否认借机清理”低端⼈⼝”) [Safety Measure After DaXing Fire,
Official Media Denies Removing “DiDuan”], BBC ZHONGWEN (BBC 中⽂) [BBC] (Nov. 24, 2017),
http://www.bbc.com/zhongwen/simp/world-42113608.
3. Sara Hsu, China Takes Another Step Towards a Service Economy, FORBES (Feb. 21, 2017),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/sarahsu/2017/02/21/china-takes-another-step-towards-a-service-economy.
4. See, e.g., Radio Free Asia (⾃由亚洲电台), Beijing Diduan Renkou: Women Yeshi Zhongguoren,
Weishenmo Yao Zheme Duidai Women? (北京低端⼈⼝：我们也是中国⼈，为什么要这么对待我
们？) [Beijing Diduan population asks, “We are Chinese, why treat us like this?”], YOUTUBE (Nov. 28,
2017), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sHG_IQ6m31c.
5. See Jiahui Han (韩家慧), 2017 Nian Beijing Mei Gai Qi Gongzhuo Shouguan Wei Daying
“lantian Baoweizhen” Zuo Gongxian (2017年北京煤改气工作收官 为打赢”蓝天保卫战”作贡献)

347

348

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

Vol. 59

coal to gas. From 2013 to 2017, Beijing Gas Group, the main actor in the Blue Sky
project, has completed converting coal-fired boilers for both domestic and industrial
use to gas-fired boilers in the villages surrounding Beijing.6 Partly as a result, PM2.5
pollution levels in Beijing dropped from 89.5 micrograms per cubic meter (µg/m3)
in 2013 to 58 µg/m3 in 2017.7 The project has completed conversions in 10 districts,
44 counties, and 328 villages of 126,000 homes.8 However, the DiDuan live neither
in proper villages (what Americans would call “incorporated towns”) because they
are too far from Beijing for commuting, nor in Beijing, where they cannot afford
housing. Instead, they live in the city-village interface, in unincorporated areas that
sprang up quickly from former villages.9 Rapid growth and the lack of local
government let developers (often former villagers from that area) ignore building
codes, and poor infrastructure meant residents had to rely on coal or wood for heating
and cooking.10 Thus, while the government’s policy of removing people from
housing not yet upgraded to use gas is facially neutral, it factually discriminates
against the poor.
The mass eviction of the DiDuan illustrates that lower social classes can be
both creators and victims of air pollution. On the one hand, many see air pollution as
a “vertical” or “trickle-down” phenomenon that large, rich industries inflict on the
poor. Wealth and social privilege do give people freedom to avoid living and
working in more heavily polluted areas. This article will use case studies of the port
in West Oakland, California, and steel production in Hebei Province, China, to
demonstrate the vertical model of pollution, and the positive effects of government
action.
However, the underprivileged also create pollution, often because they lack
access to cleaner options. This is the “horizontal” model of pollution in which the
same social class is both cause and victim. Government efforts to clean up their
pollution, while needed, can violate principles of environmental justice by forcing
the poor to bear a disproportionate burden for cleanup. Policies may discriminate,
even though they have facial neutrality and may improve air quality in immediate
and dramatic ways. They may also not necessarily eliminate pollution sources, but
may instead merely “outsource” them, possibly across provincial or state
jurisdictions, to more rural, less politically influential areas. The most dramatic
version of “outsourcing” environmental justice issues crosses international
boundaries.
This article will compare legal remedies to both pollution and
environmental injustice available in the United States and China. In 2015, China

[Beijing’s Coal-to-Gas Conversion Work in 2017 Contributed to the Success of the Blue
Sky Project], XINYUA WANG (新华⽹) [XINHUA NEWS AGENCY] (Dec. 26, 2017),
http://www.xinhuanet.com/politics/2017-12/26/c_129775792.htm.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Beijing Daxing Da Huo Hou Anquan Zhengzhi Guangmei Fouren Jieji Qingli “Diduan Renkou”
(北京⼤兴⼤⽕后安全整治 官媒否认借机清理”低端⼈⼝”) [Safety Measure After DaXing Fire,
Official Media Denies Removing “DiDuan”] supra note 2.
10. See generally id.
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adopted a law11 that shares many features with the U.S. Clean Air Act,12 that have
proven successful in the United States. The law is still new, but China’s regional
cultural differences, less experience with civil lawsuits, and uncertainty about the
rule of law may risk its effectiveness. Furthermore, the evolving political situation
in both China and the United States may change availability of remedies for class
discrimination due to anti-pollution policies. Finally, this article will use the case
study of the U.S. exporting waste and recyclables to China, where processing causes
air pollution, to discuss pollution “outsourcing” across international boundaries.
China has shown increasing willingness both to create regulations prohibiting
accepting waste and to enforce those regulations.13
I. “TRICKLE-DOWN” PM2.5 AIR POLLUTION
This section will discuss differences between the situations in the United
States and China that could either promote or hinder the ability of regulations
comparable to the Clean Air Act to reduce PM2.5 pollution in China. The section
begins by summarizing the causes and effects of PM2.5 pollution and the issues
particular to China that make it worse there. Then, it focuses on how poorer citizens
are more exposed to pollution than the wealthy. Evaluation of recent developments
in West Oakland, California will show that a combination of regional government
investment and regulation in large, exceptionally polluting industrial centers can
result in significant reduction in pollution, even when the pollution
disproportionately affected the poor. In contrast, given that air pollution crosses
political boundaries, the example of Hebei Province “sharing” its pollution with
neighboring Beijing shows that China may need to exercise more central power over
states than it practically has in the past. Recent developments in Chinese
environmental law give the central government more power to intervene directly, in
some ways more than in the U.S. Clean Air Act.14 The new laws also empower some
nongovernmental public interest groups to sue, much like the Clean Air Act. The
main question is whether the Chinese government has the will to enforce these laws.
PM2.5 pollution consists of air-suspended particles with a diameter less
than 2.5 micrometers. The particles’ small size makes them stay in the air longer and
enter the lungs more easily. PM2.5 pollution increases the risk of lung cancer and
heart disease. “Each 10 [microgram per cubic meter] elevation in fine particulate air
pollution was associated with approximately a 4%, 6%, and 8% increased risk of all-

11. Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Huanjing Baohu Fa (中华⼈⺠共和国环境保护法)
[Environmental Protection Law of the People’s Republic of China] (promulgated by the Standing Comm.
Nat’l People’s Cong., Apr. 24, 2014, effective Jan. 1, 2015) 8 P.R.C. LAWS 12, translated in EU-CHINA
ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNANCE PROGRAMME, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION LAW OF THE PEOPLE’S
REPUBLIC OF CHINA (2014), https://www.chinadialogue.net/Environmental-Protection-Law-2014eversion.pdf.
12. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671q (2012).
13. See, e.g., OR. REFUSE AND RECYCLING ASS’N, CHINA RECYCLABLES BAN FACT SHEET,
http://www.orra.net/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/China-Recyclables-Ban-FactSheet_ORRA_September-2017.pdf (last visited Mar. 31, 2019).
14. Id.
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cause, cardiopulmonary, and lung cancer mortality, respectively.”15 According to the
World Health Organization’s 2005 Air Quality Guidelines, the most vulnerable
populations are children, the elderly, and those with preexisting breathing or heart
conditions.16
PM2.5 particles generally come from combustion. Widespread use of coal
for heating, cooking, power production, and factories is a common source in China.17
“Dirty” coal, with a high sulfur content, tends to make this worse. This is because
sulfur dioxide produced by burning dirty coal reacts with water droplets in the air to
make sulfuric acid particles, and those particles contribute to PM2.5. “[N]itrogen
oxide (NOX) and sulfur dioxide (SO2) . . . often develop into ozone and fine
particulate matter (PM2.5) by the time they reach the atmospheres of downwind
States.”18 China has extensive deposits of high-sulfur coal, and disproportionately
relies on this coal for heating, electricity, and heavy industry (in particular steel
production).19 The real estate boom of recent decades has driven up steel production
in China, though in the past three years, China has closed many steel mills, as we
will discuss later in this article.20 China has other sources of particulate pollution
besides big industry, like personal heating and cooking, and older and less regulated
personal and light industrial transportation.
Even three-year-olds and grandmas in China know about PM2.5. Websites
show levels for different cities and different parts of cities, and generally people
know that the PM2.5 level reported by the U.S. Embassy in Beijing has been higher
(and therefore perhaps more realistic) than the level reported by the Chinese
government.21 Nevertheless, despite widespread and increasing precedence of health
problems, people get used to it. At PM2.5 levels 40 times what the World Health
Organization recommends for safe daily exposure, they continue their normal
outdoor activity, even exercising and dancing in public squares (a common Chinese
practice, given interest in exercise and lack of access to formal exercise facilities).22
They wear cotton masks, even though effective protection against PM2.5 calls for a
respirator.23
Wealthier Chinese have better options to escape air pollution. They can live
in cleaner, more expensive suburbs and drive to work. They can even take “PM2.5
15. C. Arden Pope III et al., Lung Cancer, Cardiopulmonary Mortality, and Long-term Exposure to
Fine Particulate Air Pollution, 287 JAMA 1132 (2002).
16. WORLD HEALTH ORG. REG’L OFFICE FOR EUR., AIR QUALITY GUIDELINES GLOBAL UPDATE
2005, 179 (2005), http://www.euro.who.int/__data/assets/pdf_file/0005/78638/E90038.pdf.
17. Id. at 12, 45, 80.
18. EPA v. EME Homer City Generation, L.P., 572 U.S. 489, 497 (2014).
19. WORLD HEALTH ORG. REG’L OFFICE FOR EUR., supra note 16, at 12, 21, 22, 45.
20. See, e.g., Paul Ausick, China to Close 240 Steel Mills, Fire More Than 1 Million Workers, 24/7
WALL ST. (Mar. 16, 2016, 1:45 PM), http://247wallst.com/economy/2016/03/16/china-to-close-240steel-mills-fire-more-than-1-million-workers/.
21. See U.S. Embassy Beijing, Extremely High Levels of PM2.5: Steps to Reduce Your Exposure
(Mar. 2017), http://beijing.usembassy-china.org.cn/20130201-pm25-steps.html. [https://web.archive.org
/web/20161215235757/http://beijing.usembassy-china.org.cn/20130201-pm25-steps.html].
22. See Chris Buckley & Adam Wu, Chinese Defy Pollution, a Stubborn Visitor, N.Y. TIMES (Jan.
6, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/06/world/asia/china-smog-pollution.html?_r=0 (showing
continuation of outdoor activities despite extreme air pollution).
23. See U.S. Embassy Beijing, supra note 21.
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tours,” that is, vacations in places with cleaner air, when forecasts predict periods of
high pollution.24 PM2.5 levels vary based on the weather and season.25 For example,
illegal burn-offs of stalks of harvested corn to prepare for the next planting season
peak in October to November, and winter sees more use of coal for heating.26 Local
weather conditions, such as precipitation, may affect how long pollutants stay
suspended in the atmosphere.27 Seasonal and weather effects make forecasting
possible. The wealthy follow these forecasts and plan vacations around them.
Housing developments outside cities and PM2.5 tours even create unexpected
secondary economic benefits from pollution. Transportation companies, tour guides,
vacation planners, pet sitters, and others profit from PM2.5 tours.28 Since many of
the wealthy, and subsequently influential, people may have financial interests in
polluting companies, and less exposure to pollution, the Chinese central and local
governments face serious opposition in both proposing and enforcing regulation to
reduce PM2.5.
China’s air pollution problem came to the attention of Western media most
recently in the run up to the 2008 Summer Olympics in Beijing. The Chinese central
government has varied in its willingness to acknowledge the issue, let alone address
it with regulation. In turn, the United States government has used air pollution as a
lever of influence, for example, by measuring the PM2.5 level at the U.S. embassy
in Beijing and broadcasting it via social media.29 This public awareness makes
PM2.5 levels a sensitive political issue in China. In contrast, the U.S. has had
significant success with the Clean Air Act.30 The original 1963 Act31 and subsequent
modifications32 passed under both Democrat and Republican presidential
administrations. For example, the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 have reduced
adult mortality due to PM2.5 by 160,000 up to 2010, and reduced lost work by

24. Zhao Yun (赵云), Yinmai Sifu Zhongguo Cuisheng Chu “Bi Mai You” (阴霾四伏 中国催⽣出
”避霾游”) [Smog Invasion; “Escape Smog Tour” gains popularity in China], XIN TANGREN (新唐⼈
) [NEW CHINESE] (Jan. 16, 2017), http://www.ntdtv.com/xtr/gb/2017/01/16/a1307063.html.
25. Mei Zheng et al., Seasonal trends in PM2.5 source contributions in Beijing, China, 39
ATMOSPHERIC ENV’T 3967, 3967-76 (2005).
26. Id. at 3970.
27. Id. at 3975.
28. See Zhao Yun (赵云), supra note 24.
29. See David Roberts, Opinion: How the US Embassy Tweeted to Clear Beijing’s Air, WIRED (Mar.
6, 2015, 7:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/2015/03/opinion-us-embassy-beijing-tweeted-clear-air/
(discussing the effects on Chinese politics of the US Embassy’s public air quality measurements).
30. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671q (2012); Jeremy Rosenberg, How Los Angeles Began to Put its Smoggy
Days Behind, KCET (Feb. 13, 2012), https://www.kcet.org/history-society/how-los-angeles-began-toput-its-smoggy-days-behind.
31. Act of Dec. 17, 1963, Pub. L. No. 88-206, § 1; 77 Stat. 392 (1963) (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671q (2012).
32. Motor Vehicle Air Pollution Control Act of Oct. 20, 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-272, tit. I, § 101(2)(3), 79 Stat. 992 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671q (2012) (Lyndon B. Johnson); Act of
Nov. 21, 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-148, §2, 81 Stat. 485 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671q
(2012)) (Lyndon B. Johnson); Act of Dec. 31, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671q (2012)) (Richard Nixon); Act of Aug. 7, 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-95,
91 Stat. 685 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671q (2012)) (Gerald Ford); Act of Nov. 15,
1990, Pub. L. No. 101-549, tit. I, §108(k), 104 Stat. 2468 (George H.W. Bush).
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13,000,000 days.33 Many Americans perceive China’s attempts at regulating
pollution as political theater, for example, closing steel mills temporarily during
major diplomatic events.34
One issue in China is that the central government struggles to get buy-in
from local governments in enforcing environmental regulations. In the United States,
citizens have come to expect the federal government to intervene at the local level.35
This expectation takes shape from historical events that drove increasing federal
power. Examples include the Civil War and Reconstruction, the Great Depression,
the Second World War, and the Civil Rights Movement of the following decades.
While China has experienced “federalizing” events like the Anti-Japanese War and
the Revolution of 1949, regional identity is much stronger, even to the point of
distinct and mutually unintelligible languages.36 While Americans think of their
country as a union of states, Chinese think of their country as a union of ethnicities.
The Five-Colored Flag of the Republic of China reflected this “five races under one
union” concept by highlighting the country’s five major ethnic groups.37 In practice,
this recognition means that the Chinese central government sets “fairly stringent
environmental standards and regulations, but they leave all of the actual monitoring
and enforcement to the local-level governments.”38
A smaller-scale example of the effects of economic stratification on
pollution, and ultimately a success story of regional government regulation and
investment, is West Oakland, California. Diesel equipment and ship traffic from the
Port of Oakland as well as road traffic from several freeways and a major highway
bridge all pollute this neighborhood. Its residents are “twice as likely to go to the
emergency room with asthma as people in Alameda County overall,” and are “more
likely to die of cancer, heart disease or lung disease — all illnesses with known links
to polluted air.”39 West Oakland also struggles with poverty and crime, and this
affects its access to government influence. However, recent efforts by the Port of
Oakland, various state and other government agencies, and private industry “cut port

33. Progress Cleaning the Air and Improving People’s Health, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY
(Mar. 22, 2018), https://www.epa.gov/clean-air-act-overview/progress-cleaning-air-and-improvingpeoples-health.
34. Scott Paul, China Temporarily Shuttered Steel Factories to Clear the G20 Air. They Should Stay
Closed., MANUFACTURE THIS: THE BLOG OF THE ALLIANCE FOR AMERICAN MANUFACTURING (Sept. 9,
2016), http://www.americanmanufacturing.org/blog/entry/china-temporarily-shuttered-steel-factories-toclear-the-g20-air.-they-shou.
35. See, e.g., Tipping the Scales Toward National Power, U.S. HISTORY, http://www.ushistory.org/
gov/3b.asp (last visited May 13, 2019).
36. DAVID M. EBERHARD, GARY F. SIMONS, & CHARLES D. FENNIG, China, in ETHNOLOGUE:
LANGUAGES OF THE WORLD (22nd ed. (2019)), https://www.ethnologue.com/country/CN/status.
37. Christopher Rand, The No Man’s Land of Asia, HARPER’S MAG., Jan. 1949, at 103-04.
38. Melanie Hart & Jeffrey Cavanagh, Environmental Standards Give the United States an Edge
Over China, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (Apr. 20, 2012, 9:00 AM), https://www.americanprogress.org/
issues/green/news/2012/04/20/11503/environmental-standards-give-the-united-states-an-edge-overchina/.
39. Grace Rubenstein, Air Pollution Controversy Swirls Around Oakland Army Base Development,
KQED PUB. MEDIA FOR NORTHERN CAL. (May 6, 2014), https://ww2.kqed.org/news/air-pollutiondispute-west-oakland-army-base/.
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diesel particle emissions by 75 percent.”40 In addition to regulation, these efforts
included investments of over $100 million, for example in a “dockside electric power
system” so that ships would not need to run their diesel engines and in grants to help
diesel truck owner-operators buy newer, less polluting trucks or install exhaust
filters.41 This example shows that a combination of regional government investment
and regulation can reduce pollution significantly.
Even though the Chinese government may not have as much practical
power to enforce regulations as the U.S. government, a provincial or city government
could step in with investments. The main challenge for China will be to avoid the
“tiger head, snake tail” phenomenon of initial enthusiastic investment followed by
loss of interest and neglect. A recent example is the large number of poorly
maintained rest stops along China’s new express highways. Large infrastructure
investments call for continuous, long-term funding for maintenance. Furthermore,
regional governments will need practical authority to enforce regulations, not just
make investments. Otherwise, for example, diesel truck owners might just pocket the
grants instead of upgrading their equipment.
An important part of the Clean Air Act and other U.S. federal regulations is
the power to compel one state to control its air pollution that affects other states. For
example, the “Good Neighbor Provision” of the Clean Air Act can force “upwind”
states to regulate any of their pollution that “contribute[s] significantly” to a
“downwind” state’s “nonattainment . . . , or interfer[ence] with maintenance” of its
own pollution levels. 42 Cases like EPA v. EME Homer City Generation43 affect how
the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) may interpret the Good Neighbor
Provision, but do not fundamentally challenge the idea that it may hold one state
responsible for pollution in another state. Dittman44 gives a broad history and
overview of the Good Neighbor Provision written right before Homer. A Harvard
Law Review article45 summarizes Homer, and Applegate46 discusses the case’s
possible future impact on case law.
Beijing could benefit from the equivalent of a Good Neighbor Provision.
Beijing is a municipality, a political division with the same status as a province (the
Chinese equivalent of a State in the U.S.). It is nearly surrounded by Hebei Province,
which produces about a quarter of China’s steel.47 The Hebei city of Tangshan, just
90 miles from Beijing, produced more crude steel in 2014 than the entire United

40. Denis Cuff, Oakland Port Slashes Dirty Diesel Pollution in Long Campaign, MERCURY NEWS
(Oct. 28, 2016), http://www.mercurynews.com/2016/10/28/oakland-port-slashes-dirty-diesel-pollutionin-long-campaign/.
41. Id.
42. 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(2)(D)(i) (2012).
43. See EPA v. EME Homer City Generation, L.P., 572 U.S. 489, 489 (2014).
44. See generally Brandon Dittman, How to be a Good Neighbor: The Failure of CAIR and CSAPR,
Uncertainty, and the Way Forward, 25 COLO. NAT. RESOURCES, ENERGY, & ENVTL. L. REV 1 (2014).
45. EPA v. EME Homer City Generation, L.P., 128 HARV. L. REV. 351 (2014), https://harvard
lawreview.org/2014/11/epa-v-eme-homer-city-generation-l-p/.
46. Devon Applegate, What about Whitman? The Supreme Court’s Decision in to Authorize Cost
Consideration in Environmental Regulation Contradicts Its Own Precedent, 42 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV.
E. SUPP. 1 (2015).
47. Ausick, supra note 20.
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States.48 Hebei’s pollution contributes significantly (borrowing language from the
Clean Air Act) to Beijing’s air quality.49 The Chinese government has shown that it
can close factories on demand for periods of a few months, 50 but it has not shown
that it can force these factories to install scrubbers and meet continuous clean air
requirements. An equivalent of the Good Neighbor Provision could help neighboring
provinces, like Beijing, sue to force Hebei to impose more regulation on its steel
mills. China could benefit from adopting the Clean Air Act’s enforcement
mechanism of suing to force compliance with pollution standards. The Chinese
national government understands the challenge of its currently limited authority over
cross-provincial pollution issues. A 2017 editorial in Quishi, the Chinese Communist
Party’s “main theoretical journal,”51 points this out, and even calls it harmful to
environmental justice.52 The article explicitly references the “iron and steel
economy” in Hebei Province and the resulting drift of pollution into neighboring
provinces and cities as an example.53 It observes that local governments can be
“powerless and helpless” to address the situation.54
China has made legal efforts to control pollution. The Chinese central
government passed a new Environmental Protection Law in April 2014, that came
into effect on January 1, 2015.55 The new law extensively revises a 1989 law.56 It has
two main features of interest here. First, the law, similar to the U.S. Clean Air Act,
gives remedies against polluters like daily fines or the ability to stop projects that
might increase pollution.57 It goes further in some cases, even allowing the

48. Mills in China’s Top Steel City Face New Pollution Penalties, REUTERS (Jul. 19, 2015),
https://in.reuters.com/article/china-steel-tangshan/mills-in-chinas-top-steel-city-face-new-pollutionpenalties-idINL3N1001FO20150720.
49. See Meng Meng & Manolo Serapio, Jr., Top China Steel City Orders More Plant Closures in
Pollution Fight, REUTERS (Nov. 22, 2016), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-tangshanidUSKBN13H207.
50. Id.
51. Life and Soul of the Party: Xi Jinping Has Been Good for China’s Communist Party; Less So for
China, ECONOMIST (Oct. 14, 2017), https://www.economist.com/news/briefing/21730138-contradictingdeng-xiaoping-mr-xi-has-concentrated-vast-power-his-own-hands-xi-jinping-has.
52. Jing-Lai Mao (茆京来), Queshi De Huanjing Gongping (缺失的环境公平) [Missing
Environmental Justice], QIUSHI (求是), (July 07, 2017), http://www.qstheory.cn/science/201707/07/c_1121279772.htm.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Huanjing Baohu Fa (中华⼈⺠共和国环境保护法)
[Environmental Protection Law of the People’s Republic of China] (promulgated by the Standing Comm.
Nat’l People’s Cong., Apr. 24, 2014, effective Jan. 1, 2015) 8 P.R.C. LAWS 12, translated in EU-CHINA
ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNANCE PROGRAMME, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION LAW OF THE PEOPLE’S
REPUBLIC OF CHINA (2014), https://www.chinadialogue.net/Environmental-Protection-Law-2014eversion.pdf.
56. Nicholas J. Schroeck, A Changing Environment in China: The Ripe Opportunity for
Environmental Law Clinics to Increase Public Participation and to Shape Law and Policy, 18 VT. J.
ENVTL. L. 1, 3-4 (2016).
57. David Pettit, China’s New Environmental Law and the U.S. Clean Air Act, NAT. RESOURCES
DEF. COUNCIL EXPERT BLOG (Jul. 7, 2014), https://www.nrdc.org/experts/david-pettit/chinas-newenvironmental-law-and-us-clean-air-act.
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government to shut down offending companies58 or detain company managers who
violate certain provisions.59 Second, Article 58 of the new law gives many more
nongovernmental public interest organizations than before--over 300--the power to
sue “on behalf of those harmed by pollution.”60 The Supreme People’s Court
expanded the interpretation of Article 58’s definition of “social organizations” to
include “social groups, private non-enterprise units, and foundations,” with over 700
qualifying groups.61 Article 58 also forces courts to accept lawsuits from
organizations that meet the law’s criteria.62 Article 64 further subjects “[t]hose who
cause damages due to environmental pollution and ecological destruction” to “tort
liability in accordance with provisions of the Tort Liability Law of the People’s
Republic of China.”63
The possibility of class action lawsuits against polluters was a heavily
debated part of the new Chinese law.64 Such lawsuits could make pollution
prohibitively expensive for companies, and thus, have a potent effect in practice.
However, the nongovernmental organizations with the power to sue need guarantees
that legal action is worthwhile and that polluting companies or their collaborators in
local government will not intimidate them into silence. The new Environmental
Protection Law gives the central government power to punish local officials for
falsification, cover-ups, or failure to enforce the law, and it holds “those responsible
for environmental impact assessment and supervision” jointly liable for harm if they
carry out their duties fraudulently.65
The ability for citizens or organizations to bring lawsuits against public
officials, at least in theory, is nothing new. The Administrative Procedure Law66
(which came into force in 1990 and was revised in 2015) authorizes suits against “an
58. Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Huanjing Baohu Fa (中华⼈⺠共和国环境保护法)
[Environmental Protection Law of the People’s Republic of China] (promulgated by the Standing Comm.
Nat’l People’s Cong., Apr. 24, 2014, effective Jan. 1, 2015) 8 P.R.C. LAWS 12, art. 60, translated in EUCHINA ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNANCE PROGRAMME, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION LAW OF THE
PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA (2014), https://www.chinadialogue.net/Environmental-Protection-Law2014-eversion.pdf.
59. Id. at art. 63.
60. Rebecca Valli, China Revises Environmental Law, VOICE OF AM. (Apr. 25, 2014, 08:22 AM),
http://www.voanews.com/a/china-revises-environmental-law-to-address-pollutionproblems/1900981.html; see also Schroeck, supra note 56, at 4.
61. Michael W. Vella & Lillian He, China Begins Enforcing Newly Amended Environmental
Protection Law, Jᴏɴᴇs Dᴀʏ (Jan. 2016), http://www.jonesday.com/china-begins-enforcing-newlyamended-environmental-protection-law-01-21-2016/.
62. Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Huanjing Baohu Fa (中华⼈⺠共和国环境保护法)
[Environmental Protection Law of the People’s Republic of China] (promulgated by the Standing Comm.
Nat’l People’s Cong., Apr. 24, 2014, effective Jan. 1, 2015) 8 P.R.C. LAWS 12, art. 58, translated in EUCHINA ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNANCE PROGRAMME, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION LAW OF THE
PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA (2014), https://www.chinadialogue.net/Environmental-Protection-Law2014-eversion.pdf.
63. Id. at art. 64.
64. See Valli, supra note 60.
65. Erin Ryan, The Elaborate Paper Tiger: Environmental Enforcement and the Rule of Law in
China, 24 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 183, 238 (2014).
66. Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xingzheng Susong Fa (中华⼈么共和国⾏政诉讼法)
[Administrative Procedure Law of the People’s Republic of China] (promulgated by the Standing Comm.
Nat’l People’s Cong., Nov. 1, 2014, effective May 1, 2015) art. 2.
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administrative organ or its personnel” to protect their rights and interests.67 This
“power to punish” distinguishes the Chinese law from the U.S. Clean Air Act. In
general, this is not an innovative power. The Constitution of the People’s Republic
of China already authorizes the State Council (its highest executive body) to “reward
or punish” administrative officials.68 China has permanent public institutions tasked
specifically with investigating and prosecuting public officials for corruption, like
the long-running69 Communist Party of China’s Central Committee for Discipline
Inspection and the newly formed70 State Supervision Commission.
The new Environmental Protection Law thus expands central power in
theory. However, for China to enforce the new law may call for a radical expansion
of its practical central power, especially since Chinese environmental law has
suffered in the past from lack of centralized enforcement.71 This expansion compares
to how the 1964 Civil Rights Act increased the U.S. federal government’s practical
reach into the states. For example, the Republican candidate for president in 1964,
Senator Barry Goldwater, while no friend of segregationists like George Wallace,
opposed Title II of the Civil Rights Act as a usurpation of states’ rights.72 The U.S.
continues to fight this not-fully-resolved political civil war over states’ rights. China
may thus find this expansion of central power even more challenging to exercise in
practice, given the much greater cultural differences between its provinces.
The lessons of the Clean Air Act in the United States show that China needs
both more practical central power over local governments and more willingness to
invest in infrastructure over the long term in order to address its air pollution
problem. However, the possible rewards are great: China, the world’s largest emitter
of greenhouse gases,73 has the opportunity to seize moral leadership among the
nations, improve its people’s health, and restore the people’s confidence in the rule
of law. In the next section, this article will explore another challenge to
environmental justice in China: the mass eviction of so-called “low-end” (DiDuan)
workers from the fringes of large cities as a government measure to reduce air
pollution.
II. MASS EVICTIONS OF “LOW-END” WORKERS
This article began with the mass eviction of DiDuan (literally “low-end”)
workers from the outskirts of Beijing. Many of those workers burned coal for heating

67. Peng Fu, China Amends Law to Support Citizens Suing Gov’t, XINHUA NEWS AGENCY (Nov. 1,
2014), [https://web.archive.org/web/20170129162608/http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/201411/01/c_133758622.htm].
68. XIANFA art. 89 (2018) (China).
69. Ling Li, The Rise of the Discipline and Inspection Commission, 1927-2012: Anticorruption
Investigation and Decision-Making in the Chinese Communist Party, 42 MODERN CHINA 447 (2015).
70. Xuequan Mu, China to Set Up National Supervision Commission Next Year, XINHUA NEWS
AGENCY (Oct. 30, 2017), http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2017-10/30/c_136713601.htm.
71. Ryan, supra note 65, at 189-90.
72. See generally Robert Sherrill, Conservatism as Phoenix, NATION (May 25, 2001),
https://www.thenation.com/article/conservatism-phoenix/#axzz2crNUSaxp (reviewing RICK PERLSTEIN,
BEFORE THE STORM: BARRY GOLDWATER AND THE UNMAKING OF THE AMERICAN CONSENSUS (2001)).
73. China Overtakes U.S. in Greenhouse Gas Emissions, N.Y. TIMES (June 20, 2007),
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/06/20/business/worldbusiness/20iht-emit.1.6227564.html.
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and cooking since they lived in unincorporated fringe areas that had not enjoyed the
benefits of the Chinese national “Blue Sky” project to convert coal boilers to natural
gas.74 Removing the DiDuan helped clean up Beijing’s air, but it meant that workers
who could not afford to live in Beijing could not enjoy the benefits of this cleanup.
Even though the DiDuan directly created much of the pollution from which they
suffered, they still suffered more from both the pollution and the government’s cleanup efforts. Just as in the previous section, lower classes tend to bear a greater burden.
This section will summarize the international and domestic reaction to the mass
eviction, explain why it is so hard for these workers to get housing and services
within the Beijing city limits, compare the situation with “environmental racism” in
the United States, and discuss obstacles to access legal remedies.
The mass eviction of the DiDuan drew both international and domestic
criticism.75 For example, Beijing University professor He Weifang wrote a public
letter dated November 26, 2017, that called attention to the government’s human
rights violations.76 The letter argues that since Beijing’s development relied on these
migrant workers, the government cannot evict them now just because they are no
longer needed and because they produce air pollution.77 An important part of
environmental justice is procedural justice, which means “ . . . the right to treatment
as an equal. That is the right, not to an equal distribution of some good or opportunity,
but to equal concern and respect in the political decision about how these goods and
opportunities are to be distributed.”78 This right echoes what the Beijing University
professor’s letter to the city government also emphasized, “respect every citizen
equally.”79
Erin Ryan, Professor at Florida State University College of Law, criticized
the non-enforcement of environmental laws in China as “superficially designed and
too often unrealized for lack of meaningful implementation.”80 When the
government finally takes action, it steamrolls over human rights rather than applying
a “meaningful” legal remedy.81 This mass eviction is a good example: the
government has taken action to clean the air, not by implementing or enforcing laws,
but by simply removing the people who the government deems the source of the
pollution.

74. Jiahui Han (韩家慧), supra note 5.
75. CONG. EXEC. COMM’N ON CHINA, CAMPAIGN OF FORCED EVICTIONS IN CHINA CONTRAVENES
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS STANDARDS (2018), https://www.cecc.gov/publications/commissionanalysis/campaign-of-forced-evictions-in-beijing-contravenes-international.
76. He Weifang (贺卫⽅), He Weifang Qianze Dangju Qingli Wailai Renkou Zhizao Nacui Shi Yuyan
(贺卫方谴责当局清理外来人口 制造纳粹式语言) [He Weifang Condemns Government’s Eviction of
Unwanted Population by Nazi’s Language Such as “Diduan,”], DAJIYUAN (⼤记元) [EPOCH
TIMES] (Dec. 03, 2017), http://www.epochtimes.com/gb/17/12/2/n9918226.htm.
77. Id.
78. Robert R. Kuehn, A Taxonomy of Environmental Justice, 30 ENVTL. L. REP. 10681, 10684
(2000), reprinted in CLIFFORD RECHTSCHAFFEN, EILEEN GAUNA, & CATHERINE A. O’NEILL,
ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE: LAW, POLICY & REGULATION (2d ed. 2009).
79. He Weifang (贺卫⽅), supra note 76.
80. Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xingzheng Susong Fa (中华⼈么共和国⾏政诉讼法)
[Administrative Procedure Law of the People’s Republic of China] (promulgated by the Standing Comm.
Nat’l People’s Cong., Nov. 1, 2014, effective May 1, 2015).
81. See Ryan, supra note 65, at 213.
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The “[c]entral building block of the environmental justice movement is
empirical evidence about the unequal distribution of environmental benefits and
burdens.”82 Here, eviction is evidence of this unequal distribution. The people were
evicted, thus ending their polluting use of coal, but they cannot afford to move inside
Beijing in order to enjoy the cleaner air there. Everyone needs heating and cooking
sources, so if the city had not upgraded its heating from coal to gas, all people would
have been the cause of pollution, not just the evicted laborers. Furthermore, by being
evicted without any compensation and a very short notice, they carry more burden.
Evicted people say things like:
●
Why treat us like this? We are citizens of this country as
well.
●
Even if we need to move, at least give us some time.
●
The police come every day in the middle of the night to
make sure we are out.83
Evicting the DiDuan had far-reaching effects for many outside the city.
Businesses, like local supermarkets, suffered uncompensated loss. The evicted lost
their livelihood and housing, as well as rent they had already paid.84 They also had
to pay for moving, as well as the cost of finding a new life somewhere else in the
country.85 Those who wished to stay had to rush to find housing in a market suddenly
with less supply and high demand, so the rent raised hourly.86 Meanwhile, the local
landowners whose housing had not been upgraded to use gas lost their development
investments.87 They all carry the burden more than the people inside the city.
In China, people who do not possess a major city residential card are seen
as a distinct class of people who are underprivileged, similar to the people of color
in the United States, and they suffer environmental injustices similarly. As Eric K.
Yamamoto and Jen-L W. Lyman traced the roots of environmental injustice to
“environmental racism,” they described the latter as a “‘nationwide phenomenon’
that occurs when ‘any policy, practice, or directive . . . differentially impacts or
disadvantages individuals, groups, or communities based on race or color.’”88 The
same analytical framework applies to the Chinese phenomenon. In China, instead of
different races, the discrimination happens against people of different geographic
locations that directly links to their social status.
It may sound strange to Americans to describe non-Beijinger Chinese who
live and work in Beijing as “migrant workers.” Americans usually reserve this term

82. CLIFFORD RECHTSCHAFFEN, EILEEN GAUNA, & CATHERINE A. O’NEILL, ENVIRONMENTAL
JUSTICE: LAW, POLICY & REGULATION 35 (2d ed. 2009).
83. Radio Free Asia (⾃由亚洲电台), supra note 4.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Eric K. Yamamoto & Jen-L W. Lyman, Racializing Environmental Justice, 72 U. COLO. L. REV.
311, 315-16 (2001) (quoting Edward Patrick Boyle, It’s Not Easy Bein’ Green: The Psychology of Racism,
Discrimination, and the Argument for Modernizing Equal Protection Analysis, 46 VAND. L. REV. 937,
967 (1993) and Michael Fisher, Environmental Racism Claims Brought Under Title VI of the Civil Rights
Act, 25 ENVTL. L. 285, 289-90 (1995)).
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for immigrants from other countries. However, based on the author’s experience
growing up and working in Beijing, the Chinese system more strongly ties privileges
and benefits to one’s city of residence and has many more conditions to change one’s
city of residence (that is, to “get a residence card” for that city). Historically,
becoming a Beijinger did not happen automatically upon moving to Beijing, and
would not happen for people who have no established residence or real estate in the
city. There are notable privileges to being a resident, and benefits include such things
as public schooling for children of residents; only residents of a city may send their
children to schools in that city. While Beijing has recently started opening up this
policy, application for Beijing residence is still not automatic.89
This system may have made sense as a fair way to allocate resources back
when it was rare for Chinese citizens to change their place of residence. However, in
the author’s experience growing up and working in China, the last few decades have
concentrated wealth and privilege in first-tier cities like Beijing. People who, by
historical accident, find themselves owning Beijing housing, or who were given
government jobs in Beijing for political reasons have been enjoying higher social
status since the Revolution in 1949. Many of these people were “accidentally
privileged,” because their workplace gave them real estate (back when property was
inexpensive or not even available for private purchase) while others could afford the
high cost of real estate within the city limits. As a result, people who seek a better
life in Beijing, but lack a residential card, shoulder the burden of more strenuous
labor in a more toxic environment such as the areas just outside of the city limits
where clean energy sources are less available. Their daily heating and cooking
activities are seen as dirty, polluting, unsafe, and therefore, in need of elimination.
The term “DiDuan” came from China’s official government newspaper, the
People’s Daily, as it described the government’s processes of rigorous urbanization
and improving quality of life.90 The article insinuates that these “low-end” people
obstruct that process. The term not only imposes a social stigma, it also marks that
class as trouble-making, unsafe, unclean, and ultimately unwanted. As one of the
people who was interviewed in the video said, “In 2008, Beijing welcomed you; now
Beijing does not need you anymore, so you must leave. But we are all Chinese
citizens; how can we be ‘low end’? We are human beings just like them.”91
An important element of environmental justice is meaningful involvement,
which the EPA defines as “equal access to the decision-making process to have a
healthy environment in which to live, learn, and work.”92 The communities most
impacted by pollution often lack the economic or political resources to make their
voices heard and defend their interests during the government’s decision-making

89. See Beijingshi Renliziyuan He Shehuibaozhang Ju (北京市⼈⼒资源和社会保障局。) [Beijing
Municipal
Human
Resources
and
Social
Security
Bureau]
(July
14,
2015),
http://www.bjrbj.gov.cn/bsfw/zxbs/201507/t20150714_51306.html (listing application requirements for
Beijing residency by Chinese citizens who are employed in Beijing).
90. Peng Xunwen (彭训⽂), Chao Da Chengshi, Za Tiaokong Renkou (超⼤城市，咋调控⼈⼝)
[Mega City, How to Control Population], RENMIN WANG (⼈⺠⽹) [PEOPLE’S DAILY] (Aug. 01, 2016),
http://paper.people.com.cn/rmrbhwb/html/2016-08/01/content_1699908.htm.
91. Radio Free Asia (⾃由亚洲电台), supra note 4.
92. Environmental Justice, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY (Apr. 24, 2018),
https://www.epa.gov/environmentaljustice.
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process.93 As a result, these communities end up shouldering more of the burden for
pollution.
One way that a community can get its voice out during decision-making or
correct a wrong is to bring those responsible to court. As was discussed in the
previous section, the new Chinese Environmental Protection Law has provisions for
nongovernmental organizations to represent citizens’ interests by suing polluters.94
This approach is intended to have a similar effect as the “citizen lawsuits” provision
of the U.S. Clean Air Act.95 The new Chinese law further gives the central
government power to punish local officials for falsification, cover-ups, or failure to
enforce the law.96 In theory, these provisions should empower Chinese citizens to
defend themselves from pollution using the court system.
However, citizens’ use of the courts in practice faces three major obstacles.
First, in the author’s experience growing up and working in China, Chinese people
have less cultural experience with resolving non-criminal legal issues using the
courts. Second, although more and more people in China these days resort to legal
remedies when they encounter injustice, the author’s anecdotal experience in China
is that going to court is such a long and expensive process that many do not see it as
an option. Finally, for those who decide to go through the legal process, recent
governmental persecution of civil rights lawyers has put a chill on the legal
profession.
The Chinese government has recently stepped up the effort to beat down
lawyers who represent people with sensitive issues such as human rights violations.
On July 9, 2015, over 200 lawyers, social activists, and their families were arrested,
and many were jailed without trial.97 This incident later became known as the “709”
Crackdown, after the date it began.98 Since environmental issues are directly
connected to human rights and the fight against corruption, lawyers and supporters
of environmental problems are top of the list of government censorship. The close
connection between human rights, corruption, and environmental justice and the real
threat to lawyers active in those issues will thus likely discourage use of the lawsuits
provision in the new Chinese environmental protection law.
Direct protests are a possible last legal resort for those suffering from
environmental injustice. However, Chinese citizens who have resorted to direct
protests have also suffered persecution. A recent example is the arrest of Beijing

93. RECHTSCHAFFEN GAUNA, & O’NEILL, supra note 82, at 9.
94. Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Huanjing Baohu Fa (中华⼈⺠共和国环境保护法)
[Environmental Protection Law of the People’s Republic of China] (promulgated by the Standing Comm.
Nat’l People’s Cong., Apr. 24, 2014, effective Jan. 1, 2015) 8 P.R.C. LAWS 12, translated in EU-CHINA
ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNANCE PROGRAMME, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION LAW OF THE PEOPLE’S
REPUBLIC OF CHINA (2014), https://www.chinadialogue.net/Environmental-Protection-Law-2014eversion.pdf.
95. 42 U.S.C. § 7604 (2012).
96. Ryan, supra note 65, at 238.
97. Andrew Jacobs & Chris Buckley, China Targeting Rights Lawyers in a Crackdown, N.Y. TIMES
(Jul. 22, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/23/world/asia/china-crackdown-human-rightslawyers.html?_ga=2.231326367.1809631306.1522625767-1389341765.1522625767.
98. China: On ‘709’ Anniversary, Legal Crackdown Continues, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Jul. 7, 2017),
https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/07/07/china-709-anniversary-legal-crackdown-continues.
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artist Hua Yong, who posted his videos documenting the Beijing eviction.99 In his
videos he interviewed the people who were forced to uproot the life that they worked
very hard to establish just outside of Beijing. He documented police brutality during
the eviction process and exposed the unfair treatment that these people experienced
and the hardship and heartbreak among them. Due to his videos, he was arrested by
Beijing police simply for recording what he saw and what he heard people say.
Fortunately, he was released after domestic and international public pressure but has
remained under government surveillance ever since.100
Chinese say, “法律面前人人平等” (“Everyone is equal before the law”).
Environmental justice should be based on this principle which the rule of law
guarantees. However, “low-class people” in China who have lost homes or
businesses due to government intervention have few remedies. They not only lack
financial resources, but also have limited access to the court system and little
freedom to protest. The Chinese central government does recognize environmental
injustice in the abstract sense101 but does not appear to offer solutions to this concrete
problem.
III. RECYCLING AND INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE
Environmental justice issues also cross international boundaries. The
United States has long had a habit of sending waste for recycling to China. For
example, the U.S. exported over 13.2 million tons of scrap paper and 1.42 million
tons of scrap plastics each year to China, as of early 2018.102 In 2017, scrap and
recyclable waste were the sixth largest export from the U.S. to China.103 Recovering
usable material from this waste can create local air, water, and soil pollution, and
damage the health of workers in the waste processing industry.104 This approach is
especially true for waste that would be too expensive to process in “clean” ways.
Thus, in a sense, the U.S. has “exported” pollution to China, by exploiting its cheaper
labor and lower regulatory burden. This exportation happens not out of deliberate
intent or neglect, but out of the U.S.’s role as consumer of the goods that China
produces, and the resulting shipping and labor cost differences. Chinese companies
and workers engage willingly in this profitable business, but both laborers and their
surroundings suffer. This issue thus combines the two phenomena discussed above:
The class of people who directly create the pollution suffer from it, but an entire
industry and market drives them in trickle-down fashion.
The Chinese government has recently chosen to address this by banning the
import of a large variety of recyclable waste and taking a more active role in
regulating this industry. This ban may end up shifting the pollution burden to other

99. Hua Yong, Escaping Police, YOUTUBE (Dec. 8, 2017), https://www.youtube.com
/watch?v=J9PgWtRaejE&t=66s (video no longer available).
100. Id.
101. See, e.g., Jing-Lai Mao (茆京来), supra note 52.
102. Kimiko de Freytas-Tamura, Plastics Pile Up as China Refuses to Take the West’s Recycling, N.Y.
TIMES (Jan. 11, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/11/world/china-recyclables-ban.html.
103. Id.
104. Examples are scattered throughout the following book: ADAM MINTER, JUNKYARD PLANET:
TRAVELS IN THE BILLION-DOLLAR TRASH TRADE (2013).
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countries, but Americans also have the power to relieve some of this burden. This
article argues that the U.S. should take up more of the burden, not necessarily in
processing more waste, but in reducing the amount of waste generated and designing
products so they are less wasteful and toxic to recycle. Both American consumers
and lawmakers can play a role in this change.
The United States exporting its waste to China arises from China’s role as
producer of manufactured goods and the role of the U.S. as consumers of those
goods. China sends shipping containers full of manufactured goods to American
ports. However, the U.S. does not produce enough goods that Chinese consumers
want in order to fill those containers for the return trip.105 Shipping companies thus
give large “backhaul” discounts for filling those containers to send back to China.
For example, in early summer 2012, it cost four times as much to ship a 40,000pound container from Yantian to Los Angeles, as it did in the opposite direction.106
In fact, it is much cheaper to send scrap and waste from western U.S. ports to China
than it is to ship by rail from Los Angeles to Chicago.107 This fact, along with lower
labor costs and fewer environmental regulations, make China an attractive place for
waste processing. For example, China recycles half of the world’s paper and plastic
products.108
This exchange of manufactured goods and recyclables benefits both sides,
and recycling often prevents more environmental damage. For instance, China
depends on scrap as a source of raw materials to fuel its growth in both
manufacturing and real estate development, and it is the world’s biggest copper
consumer.109 In 2012, about half of China’s copper supply was scrap, and about 70
percent of that came from the United States.110 Recycling is preferred as mining is
much more energy intensive and polluting than recycling. For instance, between
2001 and 2011, recycling of nonferrous metals “saved China 110 million tons of coal
and the need to excavate 9 billion tons of ore,” and recycling of aluminum (a
particularly energy-intensive process) “prevented 552 million tons of carbon dioxide
from being released.”111 Some argue that Chinese trash is “dirtier,” or more
contaminated, and therefore more expensive and polluting to process, and thus
Chinese recyclers would prefer to import trash rather than depend on native
sources.112
Nevertheless, recovering recyclable materials from trash pollutes Chinese
air, water, and soil, and sickens its citizens. For example, in 2006, Wen’an County,
about two or three hours’ drive from Beijing, had a third of the 60,000 small familyowned plastic recycling operations in China.113 The journalist Adam Minter observed
105. Id. at 86.
106. Id.
107. Jacopo Prisco, China to U.S.: Please stop sending us your junk, CNN MONEY (Sept. 11, 2017),
http://money.cnn.com/2017/09/11/news/china-scrap-ban-us-recycling/index.html.
108. Kimiko de Freytas-Tamura, supra note 102.
109. MINTER, supra note 104, at 7.
110. Id. at 67.
111. Id. at 7.
112. Adam Minter, China’s War on Foreign Garbage, BLOOMBERG VIEW (July 20, 2017),
https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2017-07-20/china-s-war-on-foreign-garbage.
113. MINTER, supra note 104, at 145.
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a common practice of burning plastics, and dumping huge unlined earth pits with
caustic cleaning fluid and unusable waste.114 A 2010 study in Guiyu, China’s
“biggest and most notorious e[lectronic]-waste recycling zone,” showed that 81.8
percent of village children under the age of six suffered from lead poisoning.115 The
lead likely came from solder dust kicked up from processing circuit boards.116
Another 2011 study revealed that 25 percent of Guiyu newborns had elevated
cadmium levels; affected newborns tend to have parents employed in e-waste
processing.117 China uses “the cheapest means available to clean up other people’s
messes,”118 and as a result, China disproportionately bears the environmental costs
of American consumption.
The Chinese central government responded in July 2017 by enacting a ban
on the import of twenty-four different kinds of solid waste, effective January 2018.119
The types of banned waste include materials that U.S. recyclers commonly sell to
China, like plastics, unsorted paper, and metals.120 This ban, called “National
Sword,” is the latest development in the “Operation Green Fence” Chinese customs
program that started in 2013.121 National Sword bans importing many kinds of waste,
imposes strict limits on contamination of imported waste, and steps up
enforcement.122
China’s choice to ban importing most kinds of solid waste may cause more
pollution temporarily, as waste piles up and eventually gets dumped in landfills. It
may over time just shift the environmental burden to other countries, with even lower
labor costs and less anti-pollution enforcement. China’s increasing consumption of
its own manufactured goods has already encouraged its recyclers to process scrap in
more efficient, less polluting ways. For example, after 2009, growing consumer
demand for Chinese automobiles put pressure on the raw materials market; this
spurred Christmas tree light recycling operations in Shijiao to stop burning off plastic
wire insulation, and instead strip and sell it.123 Regardless, China has a right to protect
its own citizens from this external threat.
More importantly, American consumers have created the problem by
consuming and throwing away so much more than they need. American lawmakers
could incentivize better consumer behavior by taxing purchases that
disproportionately add to the waste stream, like electronics. They could also tax or
regulate companies whose products result in hard-to-recycle waste, give incentives
to businesses for making their products less toxic to recycle and easier to separate
into clean streams of different materials, and even invest in research towards better
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recycling and reuse. The U.S.’s “outsourcing” of its trash makes it easy for
Americans to feel good about themselves for packing their recycling bins full, but
Americans ultimately bear responsibility to the world for the waste they produce.
IV. CONCLUSION
As we have seen above, thinkers in the Chinese government understand the
“acute” problem of “environmental equity imbalances.”124 They realize that this is a
worse problem than pollution alone, because it can result in social unrest. The
Chinese central government has taken some measures to increase and consolidate its
power to control pollution. However, some government actions, like the mass
evictions of “low-end” laborers, discriminated against the underprivileged in the
name of cleaning the air. How should government and individual citizens balance
these sometimes competing interests in order to protect the environment justly?
Since the concept of environmental justice is new to the Chinese legal
system, China can borrow the American model. Pushing to reduce or eliminate
threats to health such as toxic air pollution by restricting basic cooking and heating
needs is not effective. Such restriction without compensation or assistance imposes
“unfair environmental burdens,”125 in this case on people’s basic right to survive.
People are forced to move away in order to stop burning coal, thus encounter moving
and higher living expenses. Instead, the government should give these people a way
to put forward their voices via procedural justice. That is, they must have a legal
channel through which they can find a remedy when their rights are violated, rather
than simply being pushed away until they run out of options.
China can leverage existing indigenous systems to improve meaningful
involvement of all people. For example, the “street committee,” the lowest level of
government that governs all residents by geographic locations, historically has
offered people a forum to gather, discuss their concerns, and seek government
help.126 The central government could empower street committees to give citizens a
voice in a way that could bypass the sometimes corrupt and impassible layers of local
and regional authorities, without circumventing actual government control. In fact,
this could be an opportunity for the central government to increase its power and
clear away corruption. Street committees could teach citizens about their rights,
especially under the new environmental protection law. They could also serve as a
less expensive entrance point to the legal system, or as a means for informal
arbitration. Cultural awareness makes it more likely that proposed solutions to
environmental injustice will “stick.”
America also has much to learn about environmental injustice. The mass
eviction of “low-end” laborers and the pollution resulting from recycling both
challenge the American model that only big industries pollute. The poor still suffer
disproportionately from environmental harm, but sometimes they also create it.

124. Jing-Lai Mao (茆京来), supra note 52.
125. See generally CHRISTOPHER H. FOREMAN, JR., THE PROMISE AND THE PERIL OF
ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE (1998), reprinted in CLIFFORD RECHTSCHAFFEN, EILEEN GAUNA, &
CATHERINE A. O’NEILL, ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE: LAW, POLICY & REGULATION (2d ed. 2009).
126. FOX BUTTERFIELD, CHINA: ALIVE IN THE BITTER SEA 324-25 (1982).

Summer 2019

VERTICAL AND HORIZONAL MODES OF INJUSTICE

365

Government must balance socioeconomic and environmental concerns for fair
solutions.

